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Summary findings
Valdds-Prieto  uses  a simulation  model to quantify the  through higher real wages  that they losc because
impact on income distribution of having  a neutral social  progressivc  redistribution has ended. In the short run,
security  program that is fully funded replace a  however,  a compensatory  program is needed because  the
progressive  social  security  program that redistributes  poor lose their subsidy  before receiving  the long-term
income toward the poor but is financed by a pay-as-you-  benefit.
gu method.  In most cases,  the 40 percent of GDP available  from
He finds that if the original pay-as-you-go  system is  the increase in public debt is enough to finance a transfer
large enough to yield an income replacement  rate of at  program that compensates  the poor in the 'short"  run
least 40 percent for the middle class  and 200 percent for  (the first 50 years).
the poor, then the proposed change helps the poor in the  Valdes-Prieto  concludes  that concern about the welfare
long run, so long as public  debt does not increase  by  of the poor is unwarranted, in both the short and long
more than 40 percent of GDP during the transition.  runs, if the compensatory  program is implemented.
Such a reform allows an increase in the capital stock
per worker, so in the long run the poor benefit more
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1. Introduction
An important issue in the design of an old-age social security system is the
handling of 'solidarity' or redistribution. As solidarity has many dimensions,
the paper starts with a brief overview of several of them.
Section 2 offers a review of the long-standing discussion between two
alternative methods to achieve redistribution in favor of the poor old. These
are a conventional universal PAYG social security system, and a ser of
targeted transfer programs financed by progressive income taxation.
For some authors, the demand for egalitaan  income redistribution implies
that social security systems should presumably include as a first'pillar'  a
conventional pension system, i.e. one that pays benefits according io a
redistributive formula and is financed through the payas-you-go  (PAYG)  or
unfunded method.
This presumption is unwarranted, because 'solidarity' could be provided
through progressive taxes and transfers. If the volume and targeting of  this
redistributive channel is adjusted to achieve the desired degree of solidarity,
the pension system may be charged with providing good pensions on an
individualistic basis. The first'pillar'  of the social security system need not be
a convenional  PAYG system.
Section 2 also offers a discussion of redistribution between generations,
presumably in favor of currently living generations because technical
progress may lead one to expect that futu  generations will be richer. This
presumption should be qualified, as technical progress has impoveAshed
some countries and groups. Morover, technical, medical and geological
uncertainties suggests  some precautionary  saving is opt nial
One policy option is to redistribute towards those currently old by instituting
a pension system financed with the pay-as-you-go (PAYG)  method. This
helps the generations currently alive because a cash surplus is generated
during the first 30-50  years from iritiatiorL The same can be achieved by
ircreasing the size of an existing PAYG-financed  pension systemr
The altenative  is a transparent transfer to the current generation financed
with the issue of public debt, whose service is financed with future taxes. We
find that when this choice has been made transparent, many countries have
acted on the conservative side and refused to spend now the fruits of
uncertain future wealthL
Given this groundwork, section 3 of the paper evaluates some of the
redistributive implications of installing a fully funded pension system with
individual accounts m replacement of a redistributive PAYG-financed
pension system. As such a pension system doesn't redistibute  income on its
own, an importart  issue is whether the introduction of this scheme in
replacement of a conventional PAYG pension system requires compensating
the poor.3
To answer this question, the paper uses a simulation model of a dynamic
overlapping generations economy where three social classes coexist  in each
generation. In tis  general equilibrium model, there are three representative
agents per generation, and 55 generations are alive at each point in time. The
simulation is limited to compare welfare levels between steady states, and
assumes there are no credit constraints (see Valdes-Prieto and Cifuentes
(1993)  for a discussion of the impact of credit constraints). Therefore, the
simulations offer an exact measure of the long-run impact on the welfare of
the poor.
Two opposing effects  are apparent  first, the poor lose because the new
pension system is not redistributive. This loss would occur only in countries
where the initial PAYG  system redistributes progressively, which is not true
in many developing countries, as documented by other authors. The second
effect  is that the shift to a funded pension system may raise the stock of
savings and the capital stock, provided the transition is financed with a
limited issue of public debt and enough improvement of the primary fiscal
balance. In tis  case the poor that live in the new steady-state are benefited
through higher real wages and lower real interest rates.
We find that the poor that live in the long-run steady state do not require
compensation if the public debt rises by less than 40 percentage points of
GNP during the transition and the rest is financed with taxes, because the
second effect dominates the first one.
Nevertieless, the poor that live in the transition require compensation,
because they enjoy higher real wages to a lesser extent Of course, this applies
only if the initial pension system was progressive, which is not true i  mnay
developing countries. Based on the duration of similar transitions reported in
the literature, we provide an estimate of the  order-of-magnitude of the fiscal
cost of the required compensation to the poor living during the transition. We
find that the 40 percentage points of GDP available  for compensation are
enough to finance compensations for the all the poor that live in the
transition.
If this compensation is implemented, the middle class and the rich that are
alive during the transition are the real losers from this pension reform. From a
more general point of view, this exercise  suggests that, in the case of pension
reforms intergenerational redistribution is critical,  while intra-generational
distribution should not be a major cause for concern.
2.  A review  of  redistribution  in pension  systems.
Although there is some discussion about the exact meaning of the term "social
security", it is generally  agreed that the two fundamental  aims of social
security programs are: (a) assuring insurance coverage for and sufficient
savings to confront the main events that impair the living standards of
workers, and (b) achieving greater equality through egalitarian income4
redistribution. This redistribution can take place witfin  a given generation or
among  generations  3.
Social  security has been linked to income redistribution for many years in the
English-speaking world. In his review, Atkinson (1987)  dassifies social
security as a form of income maintenance, alongside private charity and
public efforts like the English poor law of 1832,  Britain's National Insurance
Act of 1911,  and the negative income tax proposed by Friedman in 1962.  In his
survey, Diamond (1977)  acknowledges the income redistribution objective of
the retirement portion of the US Social Security program, but points out that
prominent features of the program cannot be explained on this basis, for
example the fact that the highest pensions are paid to the wealthiest.
Other authors take a different view. Feldstein (1985)  states that the essence of
social security is compulsory savings and compulsory purchase of insurance.
In the case of old-age pensions, the principal rationale for social security
programs would be that some individuals lack the foresight to save for their
retirement years.
To avoid problems of interpretation, we define social security as a program
that levies taxes on earnings at a constant rate,  regardless of the level of
income and with no exemptions. On the expenditure side, we will adopt at
face value Atkinson's (1987)  assertion that "social  insurance payments are not
in general income-tested". This means that the social security benefit formula
takes the form of a positive constant plus a figure proportional to past
earnings. Because of the constant, the formula is redistributive. However,
benefits are not income-tested in the sense that their level does not diepend on
the current level of total income of the individual old person. The term
"targeting" will be reserved here for allowing differences in social security tax
and benefit  rates  in response  to income or wealth  levels.
We review now the main conceptual issues regarding redistribution through
social security. We take it as given that redistribution is one of the aims of the
government.
2.1 Issues in intra-generational  (standard) redistribution
The twin policies of targeted programs and a progressive income tax are a
serious competitor to satisfy the redistributive aim of social security. For
example the Brookings assessment of the 1972  US Budget proposal argued
that  '... .urversal  payment  systems  are very inefficent...  Tax rates would  have
to be raised simply to channel money from the family to the govemment and
back to the family again." (cited by Kesselman and Garfinkel, 1978).
3  For some authors, most  notably  those close to the ILO (1984,  statements N° 7,60 and 63),
there is a third aim for social security, namely the alleviation of poverty. The alleviation of
poverty  is different from egalitarian income redistribution because the desire for
redistribution between different income classes remains even when all dasses meet their
basic  needs- However, this extension of the concept of social  security is controversial.5
This alternative method for redistributing toward the poor old has been
adopted in some countries. Australia has an old age, invalidity and surviror
pension program that is entirley financed through general revenue, while its
benefits are income tested4. According to the £LO  (1986),  Australian social
insurance programs are quite generous, as they cost 7.3 % of GDP in lb665.
Costa Rica, Chile, Hong-Kong and South Africa have similar programs,
although they are much less generous.
There is a second group of countries that has chosen a non social-security type
of financing for social-security type benefits. Denmark, New Zealand,
Mauritius and Ireland have old age pensions benefits that are flat and
universal, with very few means-tests, but they are financed through general
revenue which includes a progressive income tax. The social-security
approach is to finance those benefits through taxes on labor earnings alone
using a flat rate.
A third combination is offered by the U.K, which uses part of the revenue
from a progressive tax on labor eamings to finance a flat and universal basic
pensiorL This program is not generous.
Some of these countries are dissatisfied with their current program. These
programs are found wanting because they fail to meet an additional objective,
which is to assure adequate pensions for the middle dass.  However,
everybody agrees that their current programs have been successful in
providing substantial assistance to the poor old.
This section does not intend to provide a full review of the venerable debate
regarding the use of earnings-related pensions to redistribute  icome.
However, we spell out the specific features of the debate for the case of old-
age pensions.
2.Ll Arguments  against social security.
The three main arguments against using axes and transfers of the 'social
security' type for redistribution within a given generation are the following:
(1) Covge  of taxes.  The point here is whedter general tax revenue can
be collected in a more egalitarian way than contributions paid by salaried
labor with a constant tax rate, as in conventional PAYG  social security.
In most countries, and specially in developing countries, the tax system has
wider coverage tian  the social security system. General taxes apply to a
broader tax base that includes independent  workers like professionals, shop
owners, farmers, who pay either indirect or income taxes or both.
4 See  Social  Security  Programs  Throughout the  World,  1985,  page  10.  There  it is stated that
means-testing  of benefits  was introduced  as of March  21,1985.  However,  we have been
informed  that the threshold  is generous,  so over 70%  of old Australians  pass the income  test.
5 This  estimate  arises from  the figure  given  by ILO,  Table  3, for receipts  for all social  security
programs,  and then downsized  by the ratio  between  the money  receipts  informed  in Table  9
and in Table  8.6
In most developing countries, the self-employed have low incomes, as they
work as street vendors and subsistence farmers. These people usually pay
some indLrect  taxes, although the absolute amount they pay is modest and
their ability to evade is substantial. However, in most countries, the self-
employed evade more easily the contributions to social security than indirect
and income taxes. This difference is evident in the fact that social security
legislation in almost every country gives the right to the self-employed to
either decide the amount of their contribution or to contribute on a voluntary
basis (ILO 1984,  p. 16).
Up to here, general taxes seem to have the advantage of covering high-income
independent workers. On the other hand, social security taxes have the
advantage of exempting low-income independent workers. Specific  economic
conditions must be known to predict which tax system is more egalitarian.
Another difference arises from the treatment of non-wage compensation. In
most countries the tax system limits the degree to which compensation paid
in kind (health insurance, provision of a car, payment of schooling costs for
children, food) can be exempted from the income tax. However, social
security contributions are levied on the money wage, which is only a part of
total compensation, so there is full exemption of non-wage compensation. If
workers that contribute to social security have relatively high income, then
this implies it is a less egalitarian system to raise revenue. The opposite
happens if workers that contribute to social security are relatively low
income.
One critical advantage of income taxes as compared with social secujty  taxes
is that the former can include a changing marginal tax rate. Social  security
taxes usually establish a single rate. This gives income taxes more flexibility to
redistribute in a pareto efficient manner.
Summing up, except in countries where the contribution to social security is
limited to high income workers, general tax collection has a larger potential to
be egalitarian than contributions. This potential may or may not be realized
by actual design and enforcement
(2) Coverage  of expenditure.  Other government expenditure programs
can be more egalitarian6 hian  conventional socal security benefits because
their coverage is wider. This is usually the case of targeted transfer programs,
because they cover the poor old even if they have worked in the informal
sector or been self-employed for long periods. Socal security usually does not
cover them because they have not contributed to social security for the
required number of years.
This implies that a government that aims to achieve egalitarian redistribution
towards the poor  old needs a targeted program anyway, in addition to socal
security. Several countries in the OECD  have established such programs.
6 Or alleviate  poverty  more  effectively.7
It should also be kept in mind that the assumption that social security
expenditure favors lower income people is not true in many developing
countries, as Mesa-Lago (1978)  documents abundantly. Social security
programs may go astray and end up favoring the middle income groups. It is
conceivable that this could also happen in a targeted trasfer program financed
with general revenue, but it seems to occur much less frequently because of
the design of targeted programs. The evidence reviewed by Grosh (1992)
documents this fact.
(3)  Conventional  PAYCI  benefit  forrnulas  have  a built-in  bias
againLt tbe  WgQ. Conventional formulas typically pay benefits that are a
linear function of the product of the number of years of contribution and the
average wage over the last five or ten years before retirement7. This is
regressive because of four reasons:
a) The empirical evidence for OECD countries shows that the poor have a
flatter lifetime income profile, apart from having a lower level of income. For
example, see the evidence for the Urnted States in Ehrenberg and Smith
(1985).  This means that a conventional benefit formula discriminates against
the poor. The reason is that the poor get a lower pension as a ratio of average
lifetime income, i.e. a smaller internal rate of return on their contributions.
b) The poor have a shorter life expectancy. Therefore, a uniform retirement
age in combination with the defined benefit formula discriminates against the
poor. This is because the expected number of year of contributions, as a share
of expected life, is higher for the poor, while the expected number of years of
retirement is smaller.
c) The poor usually begin to work younger, but are still subject to the same
retirement age of other workers that go to college and contribute fewer years.
This implies zero recognition for their early contributions. Even if benefits
were based on an average of lifetime real earnings (adjusted by inflation) this
would not recogriize that contributions while young represent a consumption
sacrifice for more years than contributions at age, say, 50. This implies that the
poor should get more credit than in a lifetime average.
d) The poor have less information and financial assets, so they are less able to
take advantage of some of the rules of social security as commonly practiced.
For example, take an old worker whose earnLings  are being counted for the
average that defines his pension rights. If he becomes unemployed he will be
unable to continue contributing if he is poor, losing substantial pension right
in addition to current earnings8. However if he has middle or higher income,
owns some financal  assets and has access to information about the loss of
7 This description  does not include the large number of countries with a benefit formula that
is substantially  worse  than this specification.  For  example,  many  countries  base the pension
on the average of the last three annual nominal covered incomes.
8 In the tipical developing country there is no unemployment insurance, and if there is some
it usually pays a very small benefit-8
pension rights he could suffer,  he will probably continue contributions out of
his own funds9. The result is that ex-post the poor get fewer benefits.
The bottom line is that conventional PAYG  defined-benefit systems need to
incorporate some redistribution in the benefit fornula just to compensate for
these effects, and are less progressive than what may appear  by analyzing the
benefit formula alone.
2.1.2  Arguments  in favor of social security.
There are three arguments in favor of using the conventional social-security
type of taxes and transfers for redistribution within a given generation:
(A) High operating costs of targeted programs favor social-
security tpe  programs.
Conventional social security is believed to exhibit lower administrative costs
than private insurance (Beveridge 1945;  Valdes-Prieto 1993).
However, this is hotly debated when comparing social security with targeted
transfer programs. Mesa-Lago (1990)  reports administrative costs of 6-12%  of
total expenditure for PAYG  Systems in Latin America. The targeting cost of
programs to assist the old with cash transfers in developing countries is an
under-researched topic. The Costa Rican program  of pensions for the
indigent elderly exhibits a targeting cost - the cost of screening new applicants
- which is 10%  of total administrative costs, or US$ 13.60  per new succesful
applicant (Grosh, 1992,  p. 76-77).  The Chilean program of old age pensions for
the poor (non-contributory) uses a proxy means-test and costs US$  5 per
assessment (Grosh, p. 79).  In the case studies of social programs where
targeting or screening costs have been separated from administrative costs,
the mnedian  cost was 1% of program expenditures. Some researchers conclude
that "the concern with administrative costs has been greatly overstated"
(Grosh, 1992,  p. ix).
(B) Poltical Economy.  It has been pointed out that conventional social
security is more effective than targeted programs in gathering political
support for income redistribution towards the poor old. The higher "political
effectiveness"  of conventional social security would be due to a feeling among
voters that everybody has a stake in social security.
However, political economy arguments tend to be fragile. They are specially
unconvincing when they are drawn from the particular experience of a few
developed countries and are not supported by cross-country evidence.
The normal situation is for opinion-leaders to disagree about the desirable
volume and direction of redistibution.  In this setting the initial conditions
9 This should not be confused with the common practice by high-income people of using
liquid funds and superior information to overreport income and inflate pension rights. For a
low-income  person, thet only way to increase income in the critical  years tat  enter her
pension average is work overtime, which is very inequitable.9
(i.e.  the nature of the existing  redistribution  programs),  and the differential
information  about the issues that is possessed  by different  interest groups,
restrict  the reform agenda, which in turn affects  the outcome  regarding  both
the volume  of redistribution  actually  implemented  and the direction  of that
redistribution.
One corollary  is that, if the redistributive  features  of conventional  social
security  are so obscure  that the bulk of public  opinion that does not like them
can be goaded into accepting  them, then public  opirion can also be goaded to
accept  redistribution  in favor  of pressure groups of higher income.  This has
been the case in many developing  countries,  as documented  extensively  by
Mesa-Lago  (1978).  The  experience  suggests  that conventional  social  security,
because  of the obscurity  of its benefit  formulas  and the associated
redistributions,  is more vulnerable to capture by pressure groups than
targeted programs  that assist  the poor old in a transparent way.
Two  other political  issues  are that targeting  of benefits  open up possibilities
for: a) discrimination  against some  beneficiaries  by the program personnel  in
exchange  for the beneficiaries'  votes;  and b) use of the program benefits  to
pay off poiitical  services,  by politicians  who can press the program personnel
through their influence  in promotions. Problem  (b)  has surfaced  in Costa  Rica
in the pension  program for the indigent old (Grosh,  p. 77).  The fact that this
does  not seem to happen in other targeted programs in Costa  Rica  and other
countries  suggests that this might be prevented by appropriate design  of the
program  itself and of  the reward system for program  employees.
In conclusiont,  the evidence  suggests  that in a number of cases  a well-
managed system of targeted transfers  and progressive  taxes can achieve  the
desired  level of redistribution  towards the poor old more efficiently  than a
well managed  conventional  PAYG  pension system  that pays universal
transfers  financed  with wage taxes.
22  Issues  in Inter-generational  Redistribution
The introduction  of an unfunded pension  system generates  a cash surplus
during the first 30-70  years, as contribution  revenue  is available  but no one
has yet completed  the required number of years  of contributions  to claim  full
pension  benefits.  This entails  an inter-generational  redistribution  unless the
government  achieves  the heroic political  feats of saving the total of
contributions  by the first 30-70  years and of investing  them in socially  efficient
investment  projects.
In practice,  the generation  that gains  from unfunded social  security  is the
initial  one, because  it did not contribute  enough but usually manages to
receive  full benefits  from an early age.
The losing generations  are those that live in the future. They  have to live in a
an economy  with less physical  capital  (closed  economy  case)  or with higher
external  debt (open economy  case),  and therefore  less GNP per capita.  In the
case of a dosed economy  tis  goes together  with lower wages and higher real10
interest rates. It should be noted that for the purpose of savings and
investment, most countries are closed, as Frankel's  survey (1992)  shows. If the
economy adopts an unfunded pension system while in the transition path of
capital accumulation towards the steady state, a few additional generations
can also gain (Femdndez, 1980),  but also at the cost of reducing the welfare of
future generations.
Of course, it may be desirable to redistribute in favor of those currently alive.
One standard argument in favor of this is that future technical progress will
make future generations much richer. However, technical  progress is
uncertain, and other factors may make future generations worse off.  For
example, oil-producing kingdoms have decided to save a substantial portion
of their oild revenue, as future depletion of reserves wili make future
generations worse off. As it is not desirable to consume the capital stock by
refusing to replace depreciated equipment, it follows that redistribution
toward the current generation must be undesirable at some point.
It is well known that the same type of inter generational redistribution is
obtained when the goverunent issues public debt and spends part or all the
proceeds to benefit current generations (Diamond, 1965).  This implies that
PAYG-finaced pension systems confront a signiificant  competitor for
fulfilling  the aim of inter-generational  redistribution, namely the issue of
public debt coupled with the distribution of the proceeds through targeted
transfer programs. The financing of the associated debt service can be
assigned to progressive  income taxation in the future.
The use of explicit government debt rather than implicit social securjiy debt
exhibits two advantages:
(1) Greater  Transparency.  Welfare losses  suffered by future generations
are much more evident and transparent when public debt is issued than when
an unfunded pension system is started or expanded. To see this, one must
recognize that issuing more public debt is equivalent to the following  policy
combination in a PAYG-financed  social  security: (a)  raise the contribution rate
transitorily, for one year; (b) raise the benefits  promised to the generations
that increased their contribution according to (a);  (c)  spend the transitory cash
surplus that results to improve the welfare of some group in the present. The
PAYG  presentation hides the cost of meeting promise (b) that will force a tax
increase on the generations alive in tie future. It appears as if nobody pays.
The transparency issue can be also be assessed  from the following
perspective: Do we observe relatively rich generations using PAYG  financing
n reverse, to helping altruisticaly the poorer generations ? Consider a
generation which is unusualy  wealthy (may be because of a transitory
commodity boom). For it, inter generational equity would imply that it
legislates a reduction in its own social  security benefits for the same current
contribution, permitting a reduction in the future contributions of its children,
while maintaining the benefits of its children It is remarkable that no country
has ever adopted these polices, in our knowledge.11
On the other hand,  expansions  of social security financed  with  the PAYG
method  are routinely  observed. This explains  why PAYG financing  has been
described  by some authors  as a vehicle for intergenerational  exploitation.
Now consider  public debt. It has been observed  in many countries  that
transitory  income increases  are used to pay off national  debt. This was the
case in England  during  the last three hundred  years (Barro, 1986),  Indonesia
after the second  oil shock, and Colombia during  the 1978-80 coffee boom.  This
suggests  that desirable  inter generational  redistribution  is feasible through  the
public debt  The difference  is that changes in the public  debt are explicit, and
therefore  are a politically  neutral  vehide  for intergenerational  redistributions
that may go in any desired  direction.
Note that the living generations  could have  argued  against  reducing  national
debt on the basis of the higher  income that their  children would  enjoy due to
future  technical  progress.  The fact that :aany countries  have still reduced  their
national  debt when income rises trisitorily  suggests  that this argument  has
been deemed  spurious  at least in those cases. This argument,  which is
routinely  used  to justify the issue of implict  debt by PAYG (unfunded)
systems, appears  overrated.
In theory, more opaqueness  may favor any of the pressure  groups  involved  in
tihe  democratic  discussion  of redistributiorL  In politics an opaque  financing
system offers an ideal settng  for "manipulation  to gain the electora  support  of a
particular  clientele,  to legitimate  a spurious  political  regime,  and to satisfy  the needs
and  coopt  powerfid  pressure  groups  who threaten  the status  quo" (Mesa-Lago, 1978,
p. 3). It seems  unlikely that more opaqueness  leads  to a better desig  in
practice.
it addition,  we would  expect conventional  PAYG-financed  pension  systems
to be  more exposed  to failures  of design  because  of their opaqueness.  This
can only be deleterious  to the aim of achieving  equitable  inter-generational
transfers.
(2)  nefficiency.  The argument  here is that it is inefficient  to finance inter
generational  redistribution  with  the PAYG method,  which  taxes labor income,
when it is feasible to finance inter generational  redistribution  with public
debt, whose  service is financed  with  more efficient general  taxatiorL This
point leads  to a reedition  of the arguments  regarding  intragenerational
redistribution,  surveyed  in section 2.1.
3. Pension  Systems  and  Income  Redistribution
This section explains our simulation model and the parametrization of the
income distribution. The main advantage of our model is that its
parametrization is simple and reduces description to just two dimensions.
3.1  Structure of the simulation model12
The simulation model used here is pesented in the Appendix.  It is a direct
extension to three income classes of the Auerbach-Kotlikoff (1987)  model, as
applied by Arrau (1991)  and Arrau and Schmidt-Hebbel (1993).  It consists of a
model economy with 55 overlapping  generations, where people work from
age 21 to 65 and then die at age 75. The representative  agent of each
generation supplies labor inelastically and saves in a utility-maximizing
manner, with no concem for its descendants. Wages and interest rates adjust
costlessly to clear tiLe labor and capital markets. There are no credit
constraints, so this simulation model is subject to the criticisms in Valdds-
Prieto and Cif  entes (1993).
The government  levies an income tax on earnings and income from capital,
introducing  a wedge between the interest rate paid by firms and the one
received by investors. Tax revenue is used to finance current government
consumption and to service the explicit public debt, which pays market
interest rates.
The social security administration  levies a tax on labor earnings alone (non-
disto tionary by assumption)  and pays pensions according to a benefit
formula that we choose to be progressive, favoring more the lower income
class. The income tax is distortionary  because it reduces  the supply  of
savings, but wage taxes are not distortionary  because labor is supplied
inelastically
A bias of this model is that the conventional PAYG system relies on wage
taxes, which are not distortionary  by asumption, while the fully funded
system relies on income taxes, whose distortionary  effect on investment  is
acknowledged  in the model. Another bias is that in the fully-funded  method
we assume that interest income earned by pension funds  is NOT exempt from
income taxes. As this is not true in most countries, adoption  of the fully
funded financing method  forces the governmnent  to compensate the reduction
in the revenue  base with higher tax rates, which increase distortions  further.
This extra distortion is avoided  in this modeL We hope that these biases
compensate each other.
A detailed description  of the simulation model is available in Arrau and
Schdnidt-Hebbel (1993).  Note that the absence of borrowing  constraints in this
model, and the absence of tax exemptions for pension  funds,  implies that
substituting  the PAYG scheme by a funded  and actuarially fair pension
system is equivalent to a simple elimination of the social security system  10.
The parameter values for which no sensitivity analysis is performed  are the
elasticity of intertemporal  substitution  in consumption, which is set at 0.7, the
rate of impatience  or subjective utility discount rate, set at 2% per year, the
share of non-social security government  consumption  in GDP, set at 13 %, the
10  This equivalence  is due to the absence of borrowing  constraints  in long term consumer
credit market. In this model savers are endowed with perfect foresight of their old age and
perfect  abilitv  to implement any saving strategy to cover their needs during old age. With
borrcwing constraints,  instead, a mandatory funded pension  system becomes  different  from
the absence  of a social  security system.13
rate of labor productivity growth, set at 2% per  year and the rate of capital
depreciation per year, set at 3.5% per year. No sensitivity analysis is
performed  for the average shape of the wage path in the life cycle, which was
taken to be equal to the one estimated by Arrau (1991)  for Chile, nor for the
ratio of active years to inactive years, which is 45/10 = 4.5 in the modeL
In the base scenario, we assume that population grows at 2%, the ratio of
government  debt to GNP is 25% and the share of payments  to labor in total
income is 65%. We present sensitivity analyses for changes in these
parameters. The economW  is dosed, so equilibrium in the capital market
requires that the net supply of funds by households of all ages equals outside
demand for funds, from firms and the government (national debt). The real
interest rate adjusts to dear this market, making endogenous  the real wage
and the stock of physical capital per worker. The model determines
endogenously a single income-tax rate that keeps the budget in equilibrium,
given a path for the government debt  This tax does not address  demands for
redistribution.
Regarding labor productivity growth, we assume that successive generations
are 2% richer than the previous generation, for each of the income classs. This
umples ime  inequality does not evolve over time because of differential
productivity  growtL  If we understand  income inequality in this deep sense, it
will not be affected by any of our policy exercises.
This paper innovates by introducing  a distribution of income. Four new
parameters  are defined. The average economy wage level is taken as the
nwnerire  of the economy:
a) The share of the poor and middle  dass populatlons in the total population.
These  shares are  sp and sm .The share of the rich - sr - is the residual.
b) The wage level for each income dass, at the age when workers  start tir
active life. In this respect, we make the following assumptions:
middle class  average wage of the economy
poor  "z"P  times the middle css  wage
rich  residual wage such that the
economy-wide average wage is preserved
A lower z increases inequality at the age at which workers start work, because
this reduces the initial wage of the poor and raises the initial wage of the rich.
c) The growth rate of labor endowment,  for each income class, in response to
experience (age). The economy-wide age-wage profile is taken from Arrau
and Schmidt-Hebbel (1993).  The assumptions for the growth rate of labor
endowment,  for each income dass, are the following:
nmiddle  class  same as growth rate of the average for the economy14
poor  "a" times the growth rate of the Labor
endowment of the middle class
rich  residual growth rate of the labor endowment that
preserves the economy-wide average growth rate
Parameter z fixes the relative earnings at the youngest age of the poor and the
rich vis a vis the middle class. Parameter a governs the relative flatness of the
labor earnings path of the poor. In addition, a affects the relative steepness of
the labor earings  path of the rich  Both parametes yield the relative earnings
for all ages and income classes.
For a less itan  one, a rise in af increases the wealth of the poor and
impoverishes the rich, in comparison to the middle class, for any given value
of z, the distribution of income at the youngest age. Parameter a cannot be
much above one in order to avoid the initally  rich from  becoming poorer
than the middle class by age 64. The base case assumes a value of 0.80.
Parameter af  was varied in one sensitivity analysis.
For the  =1 case, it is easy to show that the share of  the  wage bill of the poor
in the national wage bill is z times sp, the  % of poor inthe  population  AsgB
is the share of labor income in GDP, the wage bill eamed by the poor as a
percentage of GDP is Bzsp for the case of  a;  = 1, and is evenless if a  =  0.8.
Summing up, we have designed a scenario where income distibution  at the
individual level is governed by just two parameters: z and ca.  Income
distribution at the aggregate level is also a funcion  of the relative abundance
of each of the income classes, which is captured by a separate set of
parameters (sp and Sm).
3.2 Redistribution  in the initial PAYG pension system.
This section explains our assumptions regarding the design of the initial
PAYG  pension systemr
The first parameter to consider is the contribution rate, denoted by c. A large
contribution rate implies a large pension system. As all workers contribute to
the pension system in this economy, the receipts of the system are a fraction c
of the wage bilL But the wage bill is B,  a fixed fraction of GNP because we use
a Cobb-Douglas production technology. Therefore, the share of pension
contributions in GMNP  is Bc
Benefits (pensions) are made up of two parts, a basic pension plus a sum
proportional to the last wage while active. Benefits are
(1)  B(ai)  = BasPen(c,z)  + O-LW(ai,z,  a)
where15
B(a,i) = benefit (pension) paid to a person of age a,  a=66,..75  which belongs to
income class i, for i= P,M,R (poor, niiddle income and rich, respectively).
BasPen(c,z)  = a basic flat pension, equal for everybody, which is relatively
more important  for the poor than for the rich. The size of the basic
pension depends of the degree of income inequality, as discussed below.
B(c,z,a)  = proportionality  constant between 0 and 1.
LW(a,i,  z, a) = last wage while working, net of income taxes and pension
contributions, of a pensioner of age a and income class i, i=P,M,R The
last wage depends on age because of productivity growth, so at any
point in time the last wage for older pensioners is smaller than the last
wage for younger pensioners. It also depends of z and a for income
classes Poor and Rich, as discussed previously.
We study a PAYG system where the basic pension and the proportionality
constant are determined as folLows:
(2)  BasPen  =  Revenue/N  if resulting basic pension < LW(65,Pz, ca)
=i1LW(65,P,z,ds)  if not
(3)  0=  fO  if resulting basic pension < LW(65,Pzcr)
Revenue - BasPen-Nl  if not
Lj  £a LW(ai) -n(ai)
wjhere  Revenue = total revenue from social security taxes = c -9- GNP?
N = total number of pensioners.
n(a,i) = number of pensioners of age a in income class i, i=P,M,R
LW(a,i) = last wage of pensioners  of age a in class i, i=P,M,R
The first branch of equations (2) and (3) apply when the contribution rate is
too low to finance the target basic flat pension for all. In this case, all revenue
must be spent in the flat pension. This target pension is 100%  of the last wage
(age 65) of a poor person,  which in turn is given by the income distribition
parameters  (z, a).
For higher contribution rates, total revenue can sustain a basic pension equal
or larger than the last wage of the youngest poor while in activity. If a flat
pension were paid, the replacement rate for the poor would surpass 100%.  In
this case the second branch of equations (2) and (3) apply, which means that
the surplus of revenue after the cost of basic pensions is substracted, is shared
among all pensioners according to their last after-tax wages. The last after-tax
wage is not proportional to each person's share in past contributions, because
of differences in the growth rate of wages.
These benefit formulas seem to be the simplest within the class of
redistributive formulas, because pension benefits have only one breaking
point as a function of c, the contribution rate. A more complex formula would16
put a cap on the total pension (the sum of the basic pension plus the earnings
related part), creating a second break point In our simple formulation, the
poor and the rich always get both an earnings-related pension and a basic
pension.
This is a very redistributive benefit formula, because revenue is a shared
according to the last wages only after the basic pension has risen to 100%  of
the last wages of the poor. This is very optimistic, considering the empirical
evidence about redistribution through social security in developing countries
presented by Mesa-Lago  (1978),  so we have stacked the deck in favor of the
redistributive abilities of PAYG  pension systems.
On the other hand, when we compare across countries that exhibit different
values of z, i.e. different degrees of income inequality, this benefit formula
implies that the basic pension must increase whern  inequality falls. This is
because lower inequality  (a higher z) implies a relatively higher last wage for
the poor, so the rule that the basic pension is 100%  of the last wage of the poor
implies that the basic pension must increase.
This captures our presumption that across countries, there is a negative
correlation between the degree of income inequality and the value of the basic
pension in relation to average income. This is presumably the result of
political economy considerations. It seems politically unlikely for a country to
sustain a basic pension that pays benefits that are much more  lthan 100%  of
the last wage of any significant social group. In our simulations, the average
pension for the poor old is  172%  of their last wage in the case where income
inequality is highest (z=0.1)  and the available revenues are largest (c= 5%).
This is made up of 100%  replacement through the basic pension plus 72%
replacement through the earnings-related portion of the pension. We do not
think it is realistic to assume redistribution through a pension system can be
more generous than this.
This impli;s that our simulations represent cross-country comparisons where
the value of the basic pension is endogenous. Our simulations should not be
used for comparisons among persons of different incomes witiin  a given
country.
It is also useful to consider the relation between the pension of the poor and
the contribution rate c. When c is low, an increase in c translates into a less
than proportional rise of the basic pension. This is due to the following facts:
(a) the number of pensioners is fixed; (b) the share of revenue in GNP is
proportional to c; and (c) GMP  falls as c rises because a bigger PAYG pension
system crowds out more physical capital in the steady state.
Once the pension of the poor rises to equal the level of the last wage while
active, further increases in c have a smaller impact than before on the total
pensions of the poor. The reason is that the extra revenue is not shared in
proportion to the numbers of pensioners but in proportion to past wages,
where the poor have a small representatiorL17
A different insight is obtained by analyzing the path of individual  wages and
pensions according to age, for a given large contribution rate. From (1) it can
be seen that the replacement rate is (1+8) for a poor that just retired. In
additi-.=, the basic pension must rise each year because it must equal the last
wage of the youngest cohort of retired poor and the last wage of the youngest
cohort of retirees by 2% per year because of labor productivity growth. This
implies that the path of real pensions rises over time for poor retirees. In fact,
the poor are the only group that earns a pension effectively indexed to wages
and not to prices. The end result is that the poor enjoy a higher ratio of
average pensions to average wages than what may appear.
For the rich, the basic pension is insignificant, so their total pension is slightly
higher than 8 times their last wage while active. Therefore, their replacement
rate is low unless c is high. However, the rate of return of contributions may
still be large for the rich, because they enjoy a rate of growth of wages above
average when a < 1, as we assume in most simulations. This allows the rich to
have a last wage that is much higher in relation  to the average wage for the
working life, in comparison to the other income classes.
The replacement rates associated to these redistributive formulae are reported
in Table 1, for the initial steady state equilibrium of the base case. The
conclusion from Table 1 is that a redistributve  PAYG  pension system that
charges a contribution rate of 5% yields a replacement rate of 70% for the
middle-income groups, and only 39% for the rich, when z is 0.5. Smaller
contribution rates like 3% reduce the replacement rates to 40% for the middle
class and 10%  for the rich, figures which may be considered politically
insufficient  We expect political considerations to put a lower bound on the
size of the redidributive  PAYG pension system.
Two invariance results were found. First, it can be seen that the replacement
rates for the middle dass are almost independent  of parameter z, the degree
of inequality, and depend mostly of the size of the pension system as
measured by c.  he reason why independence from z obtains is the following-
A change of z changes the replacement rates for the poor and rich, which in
tum affect their savings rates over the life cycle. These effects work in the
opposite direction for the poor and the rich. They do not cancel out exactly
because the aggregate supply of savings at each age is affected, generating a
small macroeconomic effect on the capital stock, real wages and the
equilibrium interest rate. Using the same reasonLing  it can be shown tha' the
replacement rate for the rich depends  of the share of the poor in the
population-
Secondly, the simulation results are a1ms  invariant to the share of the
population  that is poor.  The results in Table 1 are almost correct for all
feasible shares of the poor and the rich in the population.
To see why this invariance exists, note first that a change in the share of the
poor in the population  does not affect the size of the wage bill nor the revenue
of the pension system in relation to GNP. This is because the reduction in the18
labor supplied  by the poor is compensated  by an increase in the labor
supplied  by the rich, while the labor supplied  by the middle  class is held
fixed. For given (z, a) and a given share of the middle  class in the population,
an increase in the share of the poor population preserves  the average wage.
The net macroeconomic effect is almost zero.
In addition,  a change of the share of the middle class in the population  does
not affect the wages of anybody,  modifying orly  the number  of rich and poor
which in turn cancel each other out. The average wage of the poor relative to
the national average wage is z at all ages, regardless  of the number  of poor.
These invariance  results are a major advantage of our parametrization  of the
income distribution.
4. Simulation  Results
This section seeks an answer to the following question: how large should a
targeted  transfers/progressive  tax system be is, keep the poor equally well-off
tfian under a redistributive  conventional PAYG pension system, which would
be replaced by a neutral  funded  pension scheme?
This question  assumes that compensation  for ihe poor will be targeted. It also
assumes that some compensation will be required, because the funded
pension scheme is neutral  from a redistributive  point of view. Our finding is
that in most plausible cases, such compensation is needed  only during  the
ransition from one pension system to the next.
In the following simulations we compare the steady-state effects of
substituting  the redistributive  PAYG-financed pension system with a funded
pension system  that is not redistributive.  The new pension system leaves
responsibility  for implementing  solidarity  to the tax/transfer  system.
Substitution  of the PAYG-financed system for a funded  scheme causes an
increase in the capital stock, GNP per capita and wages when the regime
change is tax-financed. This must be the method of financing because we
assume a constant ratio of public debt to GNP across steady states. This
implies that intermediate  generations  pay for the fiscal cost of the transition
trough  higher taxes or lower pension benefits or a smaller supply  of public
services. The increases in the capital stock, GNP per capita and real wages
would still exist if the public debt to rise moderately  in relation to GNP, but
tieir  magrnitude would be reduced.
From the point  of view of redistribution  within a generation, the rise in wages
under at least partial tax-financng  opens up the possibility that the steady-
state poor might gain even though  the redistributive  features of the PA'YG
pension system have been entirely eliminated when moving to ful fundg.
This will be the case when the loss of redistribution  towards the poor is
compensated  by promoting them to work in an economy that enjoys a hier
GNP per capita.  As the positive effect of a pension reform on GNP per capita19
is larger when the contribution rate and the size of the original pension
system is larger, we expect a sufficiently large  redistributive PAYG  system to
be inferior to a neutral  funded pension system, from the point of view of the
poor alive in the new steady state.
The quantitative question is how large is sufficiently large.
4.1 Results  in the Base Case
Table 2 presents the effects the on individual welfare, measured by the level
of indiiLect  utility function (see Arrau and Schmidt-Hebbel, 1993 for the
definitions) and for the base case.
c* is defined as the critical contribution rate for which the PAYG pension
system is sufficiently large so that its negative effect on capital accumulation
is so substantial  that the poor are indifferent when the redistributive PAYG
pension system is replaced by a fully-funded and neutral system. The
implication of c* being zero is that the poor alive in the steady state are
always better off after the redistributive PAYG-financed pensions are
replaced by non-solidary fully funded pensions.
Table 2 shows that c  is small, at least smaller  han what we expected before
starting tis  research. In fact c  is zero for values of z above 0.27. It may seem
surprising that a poor person that eams 10% of the middle income wage can
be compensated  for the loss of redistribution  in his favor by a rise in wages.
However, it must be recalled that our parametrzation  incorporates a
restriction on the design of redistribution, which is that the basic pension can
atmost  be 100  O  of the last wage of the poorest significant social group. This
implies that the total pension received by the poor iss at most (1+0 ) times
their last wage, regardless of the degree of income inequality. As this is
appropriate for cross-country comparisons, our result that c*  is very low
stands up as applicable to a wide range of countries.
Note also that for a given (c,z) the steady-state welfare gains of all tiree
income classes of switching to a neutral  and funded pension system are
similar in size, although they are always higher for the rich, as expectedl1.
This is because all three incomne  classes are benefited by a common factor: the
changes in real wages and real interest rates brought by capital accumulation-
When the PAYG system is replaced by the neutral fully-funded scheme, the
capital-output ratio inaeases  from 2.46 to 2.62 and the real interest rate falls
from 10.7%  to 9.9% before tax.
Previous discussion showed that a redistributive PAYG system should have
a contribution rate of at least 5% to offer acceptable replacement rates for the
middle income groups. The implication is that for PAYG systems that yield
politically acceptable pension benefits for the middle class, all groups alive in
the new steady state gain from substituting the PAYG  pension system,
including the poor.
11  As mentioned  before,  this effect  would be smaller  if the income  tax were progressive.20
Our interpretation  of this result is that inter-generational  redistribution
dominates intra-generational  redistribution.  This implies that the critical issue
in a transition is not the eventual  loss of features of the benefit formula that
redistribute within a given generation. The critical point is what happens  with
the generations living during  the transition.
To explore further the issue of the relative importance  of inter-generational
and intra-generational  redistribution,  we  consider now the case where the
public debt/GNP  ratio increases when the PAYG system is substituted,
suppossedly  because public debt is issued to finance short-run assistance to
the poor alive during  the transition. We pose the following question: How
much can the debt/GNP  ratio rise across steady states, so that the poor in the
steady state do not lose from the replacement of a redistributive  PAYG
system for a funded  system that is neutral  ?
The answer, provided  in Table 3, assumes a contribution  rate of 5%, which the
initial PAYG system requires  in order to guarantee  acceptable replacement
rates for the middle-income  class.
The first result is that the steady-state  poor are only hurt when debt-financing
is large, i.e. when debt/GNP  ratio rises from 25% to above 65%. The degree of
use of debt-financing during  the transition, instead of taxes, is expressed here
through the increase in the debt/GNP  ratio.
(D/GNP)* is the critical public debt to GNP ratio, which leaves the poor that
live in a steady-state  indifferent  after substitution  of the redistributive  PAYG
system by a neutral  funded  scheme. At this critical ratio the rich and the
middle-income  groups are better off. The critical ratios vary slightly'iround
65% for different values of z.
The new debt/GNP  ratio that leaves the middle income class that live in a
steady state indifferent  between both pension system s is 79%, for the case
with z=0.5. In this same case, the rich become worse off only if the debt/GNP
ratio rose above 83.5%. These critical values would be closer to each other if
the income-tax system exhibited a rising marginal income tax, as mentioned
before.
Regarding the macroeconomics  of the resuLt,  we can see that (for z=0.5) the
new capital/output  ratio falls to 2.43 when the debt/GNP  ratio is 75%, which
is slightly below the value of 2.46 for the progressive  unfunded  system. The
two steady states  are different because of two reasons:
First, the explicit public debt must pay a market interest rate which is higher
than the forced interest rate paid by the government  on the implicit public
debt associated to the unfunded  system, given by steady state growth rate
(equal to 4.04% per year). This explains why the income tax rate is 18.2%  in
the fully-funded  equilibrium  with D/GNP  = 75%  and only 15.6%  in the
unfunded  equilibrium with  D/GNP  = 25%. The welfare level of the middle-
income cdass is very similar under  both pension systems, despite the higher
tax rate of the first one. The reason is that the income effect of higher taxes is21
balanced by the elimination of the burden  of forced pension savings, which
yields less than market  interest rates.
Second, the larger income-tax rate  required by the fully-iunded  steady state
introduces a larger wedge between pre-tax and after-tax interest rates,
generating  an additional  welfare loss. A similar welfare loss occurs with any
tax method, because  all of them are distortionary.
The values of (D/GNP)* turn out to be substantial.  The difference with the
initial 25% varies slightly around  40 percentage points of GNP. This implies
that the government  has available roughly 40 percentage points of GNP to
comperIsate tlhe  poor alive during  the transition.
Of course, compensating everybody  alive during the transition  is impossible
in this setting, where the labor supply  is inellastic, as shown by Breyer
(1989)12 The new result is that only the rich and the middle  income classes
alive during  the transition need bear its cost, while the poor alive both in the
transition  and in the steady sta;e can obtain net gains if a suitable targeted
transfer program  is used to take care of the transition  poor.
4.2  Sensitivity  Analysis
We perform  now two types of sensitivity analysis. First, we consider  a 'most
favorable  case' for the intra-generational  distributive function of the initial
pension system, seeking that the critical size c! of the PAYG system be as
large as possible. To achieve tiis,  we choose parameter values which
minimize  the impact of inter-generational  redistribution  and maximrize the
beneficial effect of intra-generational  redistnbution  on the welfare of the poor.
Three values were changed simultaneously,  after checking that each  change
contributed  to raise the welfare of the poor in the initial system when shifted
individually:
(a) The public debt/GNP  ratio was reduced  from 0.25 to zero. This change
reduces the incremental impact of the additional public debt implicit in a
PAYG system, so its substitution  should generate a smaller increase in
steady-state  welfare. On the other hand, initial debt/GNP  ratios below zero
seem implausible.
(b) The share of labor in income was raised from 0.65 to 0.75. This change
increases the wage bill for any level of GNP, which in tum raises the revenue
of the PAYG system for any given contribution  rate, allowing payment  of
higher pensions to the poor.
(c) The growth rate of the population  was raised from 2% to 3%. This raises
overall labor supply  (offered by the young) relative to capital (offered by the
12 Compensation  for all is possible when  labor supply is distorted by the implicit pension tax,
as shown by  Breyer and Straub (1993)22
old), raising GNP and the wage bill. This raises the rate of return on PAYG
contributions,  allowing payment of higher pensions  to the poor13.
The results reported  in Table 4 (which should be compared  to table 2) show
that the replacement  of a very redistributive  pension system by a neutral  fully
funded scheme helps the steady-state  poor whenever  the contribution  rate is
above 3.48%. The welfare loss for the steady state poor in cases with high
income inequality  is still slight when the contribution  rate is as low as 3%.
It should be noted,  however, that the welfare loss for the poor can be
substantial  (2.11%)  if the initial steady state meets the conditions of (a) high
income inequality; (b) full coverage of the poor, in the sense that all the poor
get benefits from the redistributive  PAYG system; and (c) a low contribution
rate like 1%, i.e. revenues are around  0.65%  of GNP.
To evaluate these results consider the replacement  rates obtained  under these
parameter  values, reported in Table 5 (which should be compared to Table 1).
These figures suggest  that in order to obtain 'reasonable' replacement  rates for
the middle-income  groups, contribution  rates of at least  3.5% are required  in
the 'Most  Favorable Redistributive  PAYG System"'
The conclusion from the 'most favorable' simulation exercise is that replacing
a redistributive  PAYG system that pays reasonable pensions, by a neutral
funded  system, always helps the steady-state  poor. In other words,  there
seems to be no parame;ter values which simulatenously  yield plausile
replacement rates in the initial eqilibrium and where a shift to full funding
hurts  the steady-state  poor.
The second sensitivity analysis consists in changing "a", the relative rate of
growth of the wages of the poor  vis a vis  the middle income group, from 0.8 to
1.0. A value of cs  =1.0 assures that all income classes have a common profile of
labor income during  the life cyde. One effect of this, compared to the base
case, is that the last wages of the poor are raised, so the basic pension is
higher relative to their average lifetime labor income. This effect may increase
the amount  of redistribution  towards  the steady-state  poor effected by the
PAYG System.
The net effect is not clear-cut, however, because a higher  a  makes the poor
less poor for a given initial wage. This means that redistribution  may benefit
the poor by less taking lifetime wealth as the basis of comparison.  In
addition,  raising the growth rate of wages for the poor increases the
incentives for dissaving  of the poor while young. On the other hand, as tis
13  We also tried to affect  the results  by changing the rate of labor  productivity  growth,
but the results were mixed. An increase in the value of this parameter  raises the steepness of
the path of labor income, generating an incentive for the young to get deeper into debt,
reducing aggregate saving and the supply of capitaL This increase also raises the supply of
effective labor i.e the supply measured  in efficiency units, but the net effect on GNP is
ambiguous. Changing  this parameter alone did not increase the critical contribution  rate c.23
also reduces the growth rate of wages for the rich, it also increases the
incentives for the rich to save when young. The net effects on aggregate
savings may not cancel out exactly.
The results with  a--I are reported in Table 6. They are extremely similar to the
base case. In any case, the net effect of raising a from 0.8 to 1 is to reduce
slightly the advantages of the redistributive PAYG  pension system for the
poor, and hence to increase slightly their welfare gains from the regime
change.
Other sensitivity analyses not reported here show that other parameter
changes do not affect in any significant way the base-case results.
4.3 The Cost of  Supporting  the Poor in the Short Run
This section offers a back-of-the-envelope estimation of the feasibility of
compensating the poor in the short run, using the 40 percentage points of
GDP that are available from the increase in the netional debt
The first point to be made is that the increase in the national debt has
macroeconomic effects that have already been taken into consideration to find
the final steady state. The factor prices achieved in the long run will be no
different if the resources obtained by the govenmment  with this increase in
debt were thrown to the sea or were spent in a program  that helps the poor
alive during the transition, given that those poor do not leave bequests to
their descendants.
The starting point of our estimate is that the wage bill earned by the poor as a
percentage of GDP is Bzsp, for the case of  ca  = 1, and is even less if  a = 0.8.
In second place, the transfers lost by the transition poor due to the
dissapearance of the redistributive  feature of the social security system are at
most equal to the basic pension. In tum, the basic pension is at most equal to
LW(652,z, a), the last labor earnings of the poor.
In one year, the fiscal cost of the basic pension received by the poor -
excluding those received by the middle and high income classes - is bounded
above by the following expression:
Fisal  C  ￿  c  Wage Bill of all Poor x  M65.Pz.cr)  N poor old
GNP  GNP  Wage Bill  of aLl  Poor
The first ratio is in turn bounded  above by B2 zsp. The second ratio is the
following function of demographic,  experience and income distribution
variables:
LW NLpQQoor  old.  =  w.r  Ws-  65.-  f  f1 0
Wage Bill  of the Poor  w- z-  a = 21 to 65  epal  (+n) 65a24
Where  ep 8 is the earnings  level  of a poor pensioner  of age a.
epa is obtained from the age-earnings  profile  for the middle income
class through the formulae:
epa  mepH  l  *1  +  a  - I(ema/1emfA-I  -l)]  epl  a  z -eml
For the base case we discuss in detail, a = 0.8 and n= 2%.  For the age-earmings
profile used in our simulations, we find that this second ratio has a value of
0.14997.
This implies that the upper bound for the fiscal cost /GNP of maintaining the
transfers associated to the initial social security is BzspO.14997  .Using the
value of B used in our simullations,  of 0.65,  this upper bound is O.O975zsp  %  of
GNP.
This means that if the initial income inequality is larger (z is smaller) then the
fiscal cost of compensating the poor falls, because the basic pension that must
be replaced is smaller. On the other hand, if the relative size of the poor
population is larger, then the fiscal cost of compensation grows
proportionately.
The final element for an assessment of the total volume of resources required
for compensation is an estimate of the duration of the transition between
steady states. The simulations of transitions into PAYG-financed  social
security by Auerbach and ICotlikoff  (1987,  p. 152)  suggests that most of the
ciange  associated to that pension reform occurs within 20 years. The
transitions from PAYG  to full funding studied by Cifuentes (1993,  p. 163  and
183)  take at most 50 years. We will use the second estimate - 50 years - to be
on the safe side.
The fact that real wages grow when PAYG  financing is abandoned implies
that the poor are gradually made better off by capital accumulation.
In both cases the path of the real wage rate is above a linear interpolation
between the extreme years. Therefore, an upper bound for the volume of
compensation required is a linear function that starts at the initial value, and
falls to zero by year 50.
With this assumption, we find tat  the required compensation is 0.0975zsp in
year one of the transition, which falls linearly to zero in year 50 of the
transition.  The sum of all these annual compensations, measured as fractions
of GDP, is (1/2)- 50 -0.0975zsp = 2.4375zsp.
As 40 percentage points of GDP of resources are available for distribution and
consumption during the transition, we conclude that this will be enough to
compensate the poor in the short run as long as:
Z-Sp  5 0.164125
In most developing countries z is expected to be between 0.10  and 0.30.  For
the case of z=0.1, the poor can always be compensated. For the case of z=0.3,
they can be compensated as long as they comprise less than 54.7%  of the
population.
5. Summary and Conclusions
This study yields a strong result: In most cases, the poor living in the steady
state improve their welfare when a redistributive but unfunded system is
replaced by a funded pension system that is neutral (i.e. non-redistributive),
that is, even if no targeted transfer/progressive  tax system remains in the
lng  run.  However, the steady-state poor are hurt when debt-financing of the
transition is large enough.
The intuition for the result is the following: in the long run (steady state) the
poor benefit from the shift from unfunded to funded finance, because the
stock of physical capital can increase, raising GNP per capita and real wages
and reducing real interest rates. For those poor, tiis  benefit is larger than the
loss of the redistributive net benefit of the conventional PAYG  system, for
most parameter configurations.
As in this model the underlying degree of income inequality is kept constant,
this does not mean that in the long run the poor are made better off as
compared to the nmddle income class. They are merely better off than they
would have been if no pension reforms had existed.
This result continues to hold for countries of very different degrees of income
inequality, because we take into account that the level of the basic pension in
relation to average wages will be smaller when income inequality is larger.
This may be related to political considerations. It is unlikely for a country to
sustain a basic pension that pays benefits that are more tian  200% of the last
wage of any significant social group. In our simulations, the average pension
for the poor old ranges between 35% and 172%  of their last wage, in the base
case. We do not tink  it is realistic to assume redistribution through the
pension system can be more generous than the upper bound of this range.
We interpret these results as showing that inter-generational redistribution is
more important for the welfare of the poor than intra-generational
redistribution, for most parameter values. The dominance  of intergenerational
redistribution is also dear from the fact that large increases in the public debt
during the transition may reverse our results. We find that the public debt can
rise by at most 40 percentage points of GDP during the transition without
reversing our results. This is the maximum amount of resources that may be
used to compensate the poor in the short run, who suffer an immediate loss of
basic pensions before real wages increase.
There is an obvious need for a socially sensitive transfer program to help the
poor alive during the transitiorL  The final section of this paper shows that the
resources available from the increase in the public debt are in many cases26
more than enough to finance a 'transitory' program (50 year duration) that
would compensate the poor for the loss of the progressive redistribution
associated  to the initial pension system,  net of gains due to the rising real
wage.
As the transition is financed through taxes, those alive during the transition
that are rich or middle income are the net losers from the reform.
From the previous discussion it is clear that the program that compensates the
poor old during the transition period must be targeted to the poor old. A
universal transfer program is too expensive.  This implies that redistribution
through a tsocial  security' system would have no role in this pension reform,
either in the short or in the long run. The 'first pillar' must be a targeted
transfer program.
The main conclusion  is that, regarding proposals to replace conventional
PAYG  systems for fully funded schemes, the concern  for redistribution
toward the poor old is misplaced. Concern  should be placed on
redistribution across generations.27
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APPENDIX
This appendix offers a short description of the main equations of the
model.
Households (Individuals)
The individual is born of age 21,  works until age 65 and is retired from
age 66 to 75,  when he dies. He is endowed with units of labor, which grows
due to experience from age 1 to 55, to decrease lsightly until age 65.  There is
no endowment of labor after retirement. As labor is supplied inelastically,  his
only decisions concem savings and consumption in each year. This decision is
represented by:
max U = (1- r)-l -'t  =21 to  75 (ct)(l'r'v) (1+8)-(t-1)
subject to:  at+1 = at-(l  rt) + wt-et - ct - contributions  + pensions  - taxes
and  a21 =  O
Where at = assets held at the begginning of period t; rt is the real gross return
on assets, wt is the wage rate per period of effective  labor;  et is the
endowment of labor for age t and ct is concumption in age t. As here is no
uncertainty and the consumer has perfect foresight, he knows the complete
path of future wages and rates of returns.
The optimization conditions for this problem include a76*  = 0 (no
bequests) and:
ct+*/  ct*  (1+ rt+1 after tax /  1 +  6)
This pat  for consumption implies an optimal path for assets at each age s in
each year t (t  as1
Firms
Firms rent capital and hire labor to produce output with a Cobb-
Douglas technology.  Output has price 1 and ffteir  problem is to choose ho-w
much capital and labor to demand in order to produce one unit of output
This is represented by.
Max  itt = 1Yt - wt-Lt-  rt-Kt  subjectto  Yt = Kt1-8-Lt8
The optimization conditions of this problem lead to factor demands:
Kd = [(1-fi)/rt]Yt  and Ld = [f3/wt]Yt.  In addition,  free entry assures  that it = 0.
Government
The government budget is:
Bt+1 = Bt(1 + rt) + Gt - Taxes + pensions - contributions
whee Bt = is the stock of public debt and Gt is the flow of govenmuent
consumptiorn.30
Under PAYG  financing  of social security, the following  budget
condition holds only in the steady state:
Pensions  = contributions
Labor  Market  Equilibrium
The supply of labor, which is given by population, the population
growth rate and labor-augmenting technical  progress, must be employed, so
the wage rate adjusts accordingly:
Ldt =  >  s= 21  to 65 eSt (1+ n) t-s+
where n = population growth rate, est  is the labor endowment of
people of age s in year t. This depends of experience -the age earmings  profile
- and of tednical  progress,  so est = eS (1+x)t-S+l.
Capital  Market  Equilibrium
The stock supply of securities,  which are issued by firms and the
government,  mus. be held by households, so the interest rate adjusts
accordingly:
s=  21  to 75  ast (1+ n) ts+l  = Kdt + Bt31
Table 1: Rep2lacement  Rates of the Redistributive PAYG System
(The  number shown is the Average Pension during Retirement
over last After-Tax wage,  in % points.  af  = 0.8)
Value of z  Income  Contribution Rate (c)
(First wage of P  Class  1 %  3%  5%/0
First wage of M)
R  3.3  10.1  39.0
05  M  13.5  41.4  70.6
P  35.2  108.1  138.2
R  2.8  21.3  50.5
0.3  M  13.5  41.3  70.5
P  58.6  125.7  154.9
R  2.6  24.5  56.9
02  M  135  41.3  70.5
P  70.3  134.0  159.0
Note: The equilibrium  values of the macroeconomic  variables  for the case
with c=5% and z=05  are the following: capital/output  ratio = 2.46;  real
interest rate before taxes = 10.7%; income tax rate = 15.6%.32
Table 2: Welfare Effects of Substituting  Redistributive  PAYG
-financed pensions  by a neutral  fully-funded  scheme. when  the
Transition  is coMpletely financed by Taxes
(The number  shown  is the Equivalent  Variation, in %
points of lifetime wealth in the initial PAYG  steady-state)
Contribution  Rate (c)
Value of z
(EirstwageofP  Income  1%  3%  5%
First wage of M)  Class
R  1.49  4.55  7.22
05  M  1.19  3.67  6.28  0
P  0.62  2.05  4.55
R  1.48  4.20  6.83
0.3  M  1.19  3.67  6.28  0
P  -0.12  1.67  4.23
R  1.36  3.84  6.45
0.1  M  1.19  3.67  6.27  1.80%
P  -1.09  1.36  3.92
Note:  The  values  of the  macroeconomic  variables  for the case  with c=5%  and
z=O.5  were the following:  capital/output  ratio = 2.62;  real interest rate before
taxes = 9.9%.
e  = the contribution rate for which the PAYG  pension system is sufficiently
large so that its negative effect on capital accumulation  is so substantial that
the poor are indifferent when the redistributive PAYG  pension system is
replaced by a fully-funded and neutral system.33
Table 3: Welfare Effects  of substituting a Redistributive
PAYG System by-a Neutral Fully-Funded Scheme, when the
Transition is financed in part by new Public 12Dt
(D/GNP rises across steady states from initial value of 0.25.
Contribution rate is 5%. a = 0.8 . Number shown is the Equivalent
variation in % of lifetime wealth in the initial steady-state)
New Steady-State Debt/GNP  Ratio
Value of z  Income  25%  35%  45%  55%  75%  (ULCNP)*
Class
R  7.22  6.05  4.86  3.64  1.11
0.5  M  6.28  5.17  4.04  2.88  0.47
P  455  3.55  2.52  1.47  -0.73  68.5%
R  6.83  5.69  4.52  3.33  0.86
0.3  M  6.28  5.17  4.04  2.87  0.46
P  4.23  3.24  221  1.16  -L03  65.7%/
R  6.45  5.34  4.19  3.02  0.60
0.1  M  6.27  5.17  4.03  2.87  0.46
P  3.91  2.92  1.90  0.85  -1.33  63.0%
Memorandum:  Macro variables for  z=0.5 are:
K/Y  2.62  2 58  2.54  2.51  2.43
r(%)  9.88  10.07 10.26 10.47  10.9034
Table 4: Welfare Effects  of Substituting the Most
Favorable Redistributive PAYG by a Neutral Fully-Funded
Scheme. when the Transition is financed by taxes
(D/GlNP = 0.0 across steady states; a = 0.8)
(Equivalent variation, % of lifetime Wealth in the
initial PAYG  steady-state)
Contribution Rate (c)
Value of z  Income  1%  3%  5%  c
Class
R  1.28  3.55  537
0.5  M  0.76  2.40  4.19  2.70%
P  -0.22  0.24  1.98
R  1.26  3.08  4.89
0.3  M  0.76  2.40  4.19  3.24%
P  -1.13  -020  157
R  1.22  2.85  4.65
0.2  M  0.76  2.40  4.19  3.48%
P  -2.11.  -0.43  1.3835
Table 5: Replacement  Rates of the Most Favorablc
Redistributive  PAYG system
(Number  shown  is the Average Pension  during  Retirement  over
last After-Tax wage, in % points)
value  of z  Income  Contribution  Rate  (c)
Class  1 %  3%  3.5%  5F%
R  4.3  22.4  31.8  60.5
0.5  M  17.7  54.1  63.5  92.1
P  46.1  121.7  131.0  159.7
R  3.6  34.0  43.3  72.0
0.3  M  17.7  54.0  63.3  92.0
P  58.6  125.7  147.7  76.3
R  4.1  40.3  49.7  78A
0.2  M  17.6  53.9  63.3  92.0
P  110.4  146.6  166.0  184.736
Table 6: Welfare Effects  of substituting a PAYG with a--1.0
(D/GNP = 0.25  across steady states)
(Number shown is the Equivalent variation in % of
initial steady- state lifetime wealth)
Contribution Rate (c)
Value of z  Income  1%  3%  5%  e
Class
R  1.42  4.34  7.11
05  M  1.19  3.67  6.28  0
P  0.87  2.75  5.15
R  1.44  4.24  6.81
0.3  M  1.19  3.67  6.28  0
P  0.44  1.98  4.69
R  1.45  4.06  6.64
0.2  M  1.19  3.67  6.28  1.67%
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